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Abstract 
The Bhagwati brain drain tax proposal dating back to more than thirty years ago has been criticized 
from different viewpoints. In particular, recent literature has pointed out that this tax would hamper 
accumulation of human capital by reducing gains from skilled migration. In this paper, it is argued 
that when taking into account social externalities of human capital, and optimal policies 
implemented by a government caring only for left behind residents, a brain drain tax tends rather to 
foster the investment in human capital and increase residents’ income and welfare. The Bhagwati 
tax could even be universally welfare improving. In fact, if the tax is paid by migrants in addition to 
the ordinary income taxation, their larger fiscal burden might be outweighed by a higher human 
capital and gross income. Alternatively, if the transfer is financed by the destination country, its 
fiscal losses might be outweighed by the advantage of more skilled immigrants. 
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1. Introduction 
More than thirty years ago, in a series of contributions, Jagdish Bhagwati proposed a tax on skilled 
migrants’ income, later named “Bhagwati tax”1. That proposal was grounded on the idea that skilled 
migration be detrimental for origin countries, and therefore the basic purpose of the tax was to 
discourage that kind of migration and (at least partially) compensate source countries for resulting 
losses. 
The harmfulness of skilled migration for origin countries has been long an undisputed tenet 
of economic theory, whence the label “brain drain”. The literature has actually identified many 
kinds of losses associated to this phenomenon: distortions in labour markets, reductions of the tax 
base, inefficiencies in the tax system connected to the possibility of reducing or eliminating the 
fiscal burden by moving abroad, and above all human capital positive externalities forgone with 
brain drain2. At least since Lucas (1988) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990), human capital 
externalities have been widely recognised by economists3: as the benefits of human capital affect 
not only the productivity of human capitalist but spill over the entire economy, skilled migration has 
been argued to reduce welfare of stahing behind natives. 
However, although well founded on the ground of both efficiency and equity, the huge 
difficulties of a practical application of the Bhagwati tax have always been evident4. Who should 
pay the tax, how and when? And above all, who could effectively collect tax revenues? Since 
collecting taxes on citizens living abroad is difficult as evasion is very easy, Bhagwati and Dellafar 
(1973) put forward the hypothesis that host (developed) countries could be charged with the task of 
collecting the tax and then routing revenues to origin (underdeveloped) countries. But destination 
countries are likely to be little willing to levy and transfer a tax on skilled immigrants for a number 
of reasons. If the Bhagwati tax was additional to ordinary taxation, it could damage the country in 
the competition for skilled migrants5, without mentioning that taxing migrants more than residents 
would be perceived as odious and discriminatory and could sometimes be even forbidden by 
constitutional laws. On the other hand, destination countries’ governments would be probably 
reluctant as well to treat a portion of the ordinary tax on migrants’ income as Bhagwati taxation and 
transfer it to origin countries, as this would imply missing a share of fiscal revenues. An additional 
                                                 
1 The Bhagwati tax (or alternatively “brain drain tax”) was originally proposed in Bhagwati (1972) and then more in 
detail in Bhagwati and Partington (1976). Other references are reported in Wilson (2006). 
2 Only this latter issue is addressed in this paper. For a survey on the literature about skilled migration and distortions in 
labour markets, see for example Commander et al. (2003). The problem of fiscal losses deriving from brain drain is 
analyzed, among others, by Lucas (2005). The effects of migration on fiscal competition are considered for example by 
Egger et al. (2007). Some possible distortions induced in the tax system are illustrated by Wilson (2006). 
3 An interpretation of microeconomic mechanisms generating these externalities is provided by Acemoglu (1996). For a 
theoretical and empirical survey on the topic, see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005). 
4 The difficulties of the implementation of a Bhagwati tax have led to look for alternative ways to induce migrants to 
pay a brain drain tax. See for example the “voluntary brain drain tax” proposed by Wilson (2008). 
5 The prospect of a battle for brains (i.e. a competition to attract skilled workforce) among advanced economies in the 
close future is gaining increasing attention among scholars. On this issue, see for example Bertoli et al. (2009).    
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argument is that non benevolent origin countries’ governments could abuse transfers, by using 
resources for wasteful expenditures. This concern, justified or not, would be another obstacle to the 
practical implementation of a Bhagwati tax, probably even allowing for the intermediation of 
international authorities. 
More recently, a new strand of literature has confuted the belief that skilled migration be 
necessarily detrimental for origin countries, thus undermining even the theoretical basis of the 
Bhagwati tax. A number of contributions have emphasized positive effects of skilled migration on 
origin countries’ welfare, possibly offsetting losses connected to human capital flight6. Emigrants’ 
remittances, return migration and diaspora externalities for example are argued to exert a beneficial  
impact on origin economies through the contribution to income, the promotion of good practices, 
the establishment of networks facilitating trade and investment linkages and the diffusion of  
knowledge and technology. A further beneficial feedback of skilled migration (particularly relevant 
to this paper) has been identified in the increased incentive to invest in human capital prompted by 
migration perspectives. According to this view7, higher returns to human capital abroad encourage 
individuals to invest in human capital more than they would do in a closed economy. But since a 
share of workers ultimately does not migrate, their behaviour increases aggregate human capital in 
the home country and, through its positive externalities, benefits the local economy. 
Summing up, skilled migration is not necessarily detrimental for source countries and it 
might even favour (rather than hamper) human capital accumulation. Moreover, taxing brain drain 
involves severe legal, administrative and practical problems. Is there then any scope left to a 
Bhagwati tax? The answer of this paper is positive. Its simple argument is that the Bhagwati tax 
might induce governments caring only for voters’ welfare to take into account the benefits which 
skilled migrants enjoy in virtue of a higher human capital. Since a share of migrants’ larger income 
abroad is gained by left behind residents through the tax, government internalises part of migration 
benefits and implements education policies more oriented to human capital accumulation. 
To develop this point, we need to consider skilled migration in an economy characterised by 
public education policies affecting human capital formation. In the real world, public intervention in 
education is massive. Education policies are widespread and pervasive, particularly in rich countries 
but also in less developed countries. Recent data by OECD (2008) show that in developed countries 
more than 85% of the direct cost of education is financed by public sources (for EU countries more 
than 90%). Concerning less developed countries, the share of total education expenditure from 
public sources is more variable (also because of the heterogeneity of indicators) but often larger 
                                                 
6 Docquier and Rapoport (2009) examine some of the channels through which skilled migration may positively affect 
human capital of origin countries. An increasing bulk of empirical investigations has recently developed to assess the 
net overall impact of brain drain on sending countries’ human capital, income and welfare; see for example Beine et al. 
(2001, 2007, 2008) and Docquier and Rapoport (2009). 
7 The original contributions are due to Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997, 1998), and Vidal (1998).  
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than 70%8. This evidence clearly suggests that choices on human capital formation can not be 
adequately considered without taking account of government behaviour since human capital is 
ultimately determined by education policies as much as by private preferences. 
 Recent literature has dealt with possible interactions between education policies and skilled 
migration. For example, Justman and Thisse (1997) and Poutvaara (2004 and 2008) show that 
labour mobility reduces the incentive for national public funding of internationally applicable 
education; Egger et al. (2007) analyze the incentives for national governments to provide higher 
education in the presence of migration and argue that international coordination tends to increase 
public education expenditure compared to non-cooperation; Mendolicchio et al. (2009), dealing 
with a two-sector economy with a sufficiently large difference between total factor productivities, 
demonstrate that education subsidies in the low skill sector increase expected total surplus, while 
subsidies in the high skill sector reduce it. More relevant to this paper, Stark and Wang (2002) show 
that migration, by stimulating human capital formation, could be a good substitute for education 
policies. So by controlling migration rate, government can target optimal human capital without any 
need to subsidize schooling. Docquier et al. (2008) construct a more general framework realistically 
allowing for distortions and costs connected to both controlling on emigration and handing out and 
financing education subsidies. In their model,  the result of Stark and Wang (2002) holds when tax 
perception costs are higher than emigration control costs; when instead taxation costs are lower, 
optimal emigration is zero and the optimal education subsidy is decreasing with migration rate (this 
happens also when emigration rate is exogenously given). In this latter case skilled migration turns 
out to curb human capital accumulation so that, as Docquier et al. (2008) conclude, “the beneficial 
brain drain hypothesis hardly resists a normative analysis”. 
The distinctive features of this paper are the existence of groups of workers with different 
talent and attitude to migrate and an explicit rationale for the government objective function. Private 
choices on human capital are assumed to be affected by a social planner through balanced budget 
education subsidies. The government aims at maximising the probability of being re-elected which 
depends on the ex-post welfare of resident citizens, the only ones who are supposed to vote. In a 
closed economy (i.e. with a zero migration rate), with social externalities deriving from the 
economy-wide average human capital, government subsidizes education to increase human capital 
accumulation toward the socially optimal level. The chance to migrate does not alter the socially 
optimal individual human capital, as government cares only for left behind residents welfare. With 
                                                 
8 World Bank (2009) reports the share of total education expenditure from public sources for a sample of countries 
(average over the years in brackets): Burkina Faso (1999-2002) 76.5; Cambodia (1999-2001) 36.3; El Salvador (1999-
2003) 84.9; Gambia (1999-2004) 69.3; Ghana (2004) 89.0; Guinea (1999-2002) 78.1; Kosovo (2000-2004) 76.9; 
Lebanon (2004) 37.7; Malawi (2004) 72.0; Mozambique (2000-2001) 65.2; Nicaragua (2002-2006) 76.4; Niger (2000-
2002) 82,9; Tajikistan (2005-2006) 86.2; Timor-Leste (2001-2002) 32.5; Turkey (2002) 62.3; Uganda (2003) 87.7; 
West Bank and Gaza (2000-2003) 35.7. 
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respect to the closed economy, subsidies are lower since the gap between individual and 
government target is smaller. If skilled migration occurs (i.e. if more skilled than unskilled workers 
migrate), the mean value of human capital decreases and both residents’ social welfare and per 
capita income do so too: migration is unambiguously detrimental and brain drain takes place. In this 
case, a Bhagwati tax could be levied, aiming not at discouraging migration and reducing the 
incentive to human capital accumulation but at internalising benefits from migration and leading the 
social planner to pursue a higher human capital. Notably, in this framework the Bhagwati tax could 
be beneficial for all agents so that the practical difficulties that its implementation encounters might 
be in part alleviated. In fact, for migrants a larger fiscal burden could be outweighed by higher 
human capital and gross income, while destination countries could find it profitable to transfer (a 
share of) taxes on migrants’ income to origin countries in exchange for more skilled immigration. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, section 2 builds on 
Stark and Wang (2002) to develop a simple closed economy model with human capital  
externalities and positive government education subsidies. Section 3 allows for migration and a 
different attitude to migrate for talented and untalented workers, and studies the joint effects of 
education policies and migration. Section 4 introduces the Bhagwati tax and shows its positive 
effects on residents’ human capital and welfare. In addition the conditions under which this tax can 
be universally welfare improving are derived. Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions of the 
paper. 
 
2. The closed-economy model 
Consider an economy populated by n  workers, distinct into two possible types }{ ϑυθ ,∈ , where 
υ  and ϑ  stand respectively for untalented and talented, with 1)Pr( <== qϑθ . Workers live 
three  periods. In the first period they are born, get aware of their own type and invest in education 
to accumulate human capital θh , which is universally observable (assume it is revealed by school 
marks). The cost function of forming human capital  2
2
1
θ
θ
θ hk
c =  is assumed to be increasing and 
convex in the amount of human capital and decreasing with individual talent θk . Without loss of 
generality, I assume that 10 <= kkθ  for υθ = , and 1=θk  otherwise. 
Government may influence individual choices on human capital accumulation by granting 
subsidies in the form of vouchers proportional to the cost of human capital θc  (i.e. vouchers entitle 
to a reduction of θs % on education cost) financed by taxes proportional to human capital. 
Education policies are assumed to be budget balanced, i.e. subject to the constraint that aggregate 
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subsidies are at most equal to aggregate taxes. As customary in this kind of models (see Stark and 
Wang (2002)), I assume that government respects the budget constraint by choosing suitable values 
for unit subsidies θs  and taxes θt  such that9,  
θθθθ
θ
θ ∀= hth
k
s 2)(
2
,          (1) 
with 10 ≤≤ θt  and  10 ≤≤ θs . In equilibrium each group (and all workers belonging to the 
group, if they have the same human capital) pays taxes equal to the subsidies it has received. In this 
way the allocation effects of policies are disentangled from redistributive issues. 
In the second period, individuals work and get a wage θω  net of human capital (and 
possibly other) taxes. For simplicity, leisure is assumed not to affect utility so that the number of 
worked hours can be considered fixed and normalised to 1. For the sake of simplicity, a linear 
production function is assumed with externalities accruing from the economy-wide average human 
capital10 )])(1()([ hhqhhqnY λβλβ υϑ +−++=  for 0>ϑh  and 0>υh , where β  and λ  
respectively denote private and social returns to human capital ( 0≥> λβ ) and 
υϑ hqqhh )1( −+=  is the average human capital. The marginal productivity of an additional 
talented worker (i.e. the effect of an increase in nq  on Y ) is equal to the wage  hh λβω ϑϑ += , 
and likewise, the wage of untalented workers is hh λβω υυ += . Wages therefore turn out depend 
upon both individual and the average level of human capital. 
Individual welfare is 2
2
1)( θ
θ
θθθθ λβ hk
shhtW −−+−= , i.e. the net wage minus the cost 
of human capital net of subsidies. Notice that UWW θθ ≤≤0 . The first inequality is imposed by 
the workers’ budget constraint. The threshold UWθ  is reached when the human capital of the other 
group of workers is at the highest value compatible with their budget constraint 0=−θW  so as to 
produce the largest externalities on type θ  workers’ wage. As long as a strictly positive welfare is 
feasible for each group, the welfare of any worker is strictly less than UWθ . 
In the third period elections are held. The incumbent government aims at being re-elected to 
the next term. Workers decide whether to vote for it or for an alternative competitor, making their 
                                                 
9 Notice that each group (and all workers belonging to the group, if they have the same human capital) pays taxes equal 
to the subsidies it has received. In this way the allocation effects of policies (we are interested in) are disentangled from 
redistributive issues. 
10 Many of the following results would be qualitatively unaltered by using a logarithmic production function as in Stark 
and Wang (2002), at the cost of considerable additional awkwardness. 
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decision dependent on the value of their actual ex-post welfare, which in turn depends on 
government behaviour. As in our case the focus is not on electoral accountability (like in the strand 
of literature originated by Besley and Coate, 1997) but rather on the representation of 
heterogeneous voters’ interests, issues such as information asymmetries and politician misbehaviour 
are ruled out11. As a consequence, to maximise re-election probability, government has to be 
genuinely committed to maximise the welfare of talented and untalented workers. 
As a useful benchmark, let us first look at the case in which no education policies are 
implemented (i.e. 0== ts ). If government sets zero subsidies and taxes, the individual welfare is 
simply  
2
2
1
θ
θ
θθ λβ hkhhW −+= .       (2) 
Individual workers of type θ  choose their optimal private human capital by maximizing (2). Since 
the impact of the individual choice on average human capital is negligible, h  is taken as given and  
social returns are not internalised in the workers’ decision. In this case, optimal human capital is 
immediately derived as βϑ =Phˆ  for type ϑ  workers and  βυ 0ˆ khP =  for type υ . Not 
surprisingly, PP hh υϑ ˆˆ >  i.e. talented individuals find it profitable to invest in human capital more 
than untalented. So the former become skilled workers whereas the latter rationally prefer to remain 
unskilled. Substituting optimal human capital back into h  and (2), we immediately get the average 
human capital QkqqhP βββ =−+= 0)1( , with 0)1( kqqQ −+≡ . Optimal individual welfare 
and average welfare are easily calculated to be respectively )
2
(ˆ QkW P λββ θθ +=  and 
Q)(Wˆ P λββ +=
2
. 
Let us now consider an incumbent government whose intent is to be re-elected. Let  
υϑυϑ ΠΠΠ )q(q)q,W,W( −+= 1  be its re-election probability, equal to the mean value of the 
conditional probabilities θΠ  that talented and untalented vote it. The stochastic approach can be 
justified in several ways. The actual welfare and the past performance of government are usually 
not the unique criteria on which voters’ decisions are based. Even in this case, the assessment of the 
incumbent ability may be affected by exogenous circumstances independent of government 
behaviour. In the same way, the perceived competencies and political preferences (in favour of one 
                                                 
11 The possibility that groups (skilled and unskilled; migrants and residents) may influence government behaviour 
through lobbying activities or financial incentives like in the approach of “protection function” (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994; Eicher and Osang, 2002) is also excluded. 
 7
or the other group) of competitors may vary and affect re-election chances. Finally, there is an 
argument of realism, as in a deterministic approach, government would tend to be very (probably 
too) partisan: in order to be re-elected, it would maximize the welfare of median voter (who is of 
type ϑ  if 21 /q >  and of type υ  if  21 /q < ) at the cost of a (possibly strong) reduction in the 
welfare of the minority group. 
For both θ ’s, I assume that θθθθ πΠ W)W( =  is a continuous linear function increasing in 
θW  with support [ ]TW, θ0 , where θθθ ∀≥ UT WW , with 00 =)(θΠ , 1=)W( TθθΠ . The 
parameter θπ  measures the impact of changes in welfare on the probability that group θ  electorate 
vote the incumbent government. In the absence of ideological preferences, it seems sensible to 
assume πππ υϑ == . In this case, maximising the probability of re-election amounts  to maximize 
the average welfare (i.e. the social welfare function):  
υϑυυϑϑ λλββ hqqhhkhqhhqW
G )1(
2
1)1(
2
1 2
0
2 −++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= .   (3) 
Simple calculations show that λβϑ
ϑ
+=≡ GG
h
hW ˆmaxarg , )(ˆmaxarg 0 λβυ
υ
+=≡ khW GG
h
 
and then 
PG hQh >+= )( λβ . 
As expected, public intervention induces to magnify the investment in human capital of both 
groups, due to the internalization of positive externalities both inside each group and between 
groups. In order to push private workers to form a larger human capital, the government grants 
subsidies and levies taxes seconding constraint (1), so that the optimal human capital becomes 
θ
θθθ
β
s
tkhP −
−=
1
)(ˆ . The solution of the system formed by equations (1) and θθθ ∀= GP hh ˆˆ  yields 
θλβ
λ
θ ∀+=
2sˆ  and θλθ ∀=tˆ , i.e. the amount of subsidy and tax rates which allow 
government to accomplish its targets12. Social welfare is now PG WˆQ)(Wˆ >+=
2
2λβ
 while per 
capita income is QyQy PG )(ˆ)(ˆ 2 λββλβ +=>+= .  
These results can be summarised by 
 
                                                 
12 Unlike what happens in the case of migration (see the following section), here subsidy and tax rates are equal for both 
types of workers as only two out of four equations of the system (1) and θθθ ∀= GP hh ˆˆ  are independent. 
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Proposition 1. In a closed economy, a government aiming at being re-elected sets positive 
education subsidies and thus increases average human capital, social welfare and per capita 
income. 
 
It is worthwhile to notice that, although Ghθˆ  maximises social welfare (3), education policy 
does not necessarily maximises the individual welfare )(
2
)(ˆ
22
λβλλβ θθ ++−= QkW G . 
Simple but tedious calculations show that with respect to the no-policy case, average welfare is 
increased by the quantity 
2
2λQ
. However, different types of workers have different gains, 
amounting to ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
02 kQλ  for untalented and ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
2
12 Qλ  for talented. This latter is lower than 
the former and negative for 
)1(2
21
0 q
qk −
−< . The interpretation is straight: the increase in human 
capital leads individuals to face additional costs and benefits partly due to the positive externality. 
Since the rise of human capital in response to subsidies is stronger for talented, the externality is 
greater for untalented. The less talent have untalented, the lower externalities are brought to talented 
workers by education policy. 
 
3. Migration 
Let us now introduce migration in the analysis. In the second period, after forming human capital 
and before starting to work, individuals make the decision on where to work, i.e. whether to migrate 
or staying at home. Suppose that migration involves a fixed cost θm . Let in destination country be 
the production function identical to that of source country, the average level of human capital  not 
lower than in source country hh ≥′ , and private and social returns to human capital be 
respectively measured by coefficients α  and η , such that βα >  and λη > . 
To introduce brain drain in the model, I assume that υm  is so high to deter unskilled 
workers from migrating. Also, I consider two types of skilled workers }{ µνρ ,∈ , where ν  and µ  
stand respectively for immobile and mobile, with p== )Pr( µρ . If the worker belongs to the ν  
type, her migration cost is as high as υm  and she will not migrate. Instead, in case µρ = , the 
migration cost 0mm =ϑµ  is so low that she surely migrates. Assuming that the worker realizes her 
own type ρ  only after she has finished to form human capital, talented will expect to migrate with 
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probability p 13. After migration takes place, the share of talented over total staying behind 
population will be q
pq
pqqz <−
−≡
1
. Analogously to Q , let us define QzkzZ <−+≡ )1(0 . 
The chance of migrating makes the optimisation problem of talented to boil down to 
maximise 
[ ] 20 2
1)'()1())1(()(max ϑϑϑϑϑ ηλβα hsmhphphtppWE −−−+−+−−+= ,      (4) 
whence the private optimal human capital turns out to be 
ϑ
ϑϑ
βαβ
s
pth P −
−+−=
1
)(~
, and in the 
case of no policy intervention simply [ ])(~ βαβϑ −+= ph P . Conversely, the untalented still 
maximises 
2
02
1)( υυυυυ λβ hk
shhtW −−+−=       (4’) 
so that without education policies, βυ 0kh~ P = . The pre-migration average human capital is 
)(pqQ βαβ −+  while its after-migration value is )(pzZh~ P βαβ −+= . 
This allows to write: 
 
Proposition 2. Without education policies, a positive probability of migrating for skilled workers 
increases the pre-emigration average human capital and has ambiguous effects on the after-
emigration average human capital and residents’ social welfare. 
Proof in Appendix. 
 
Proposition 2 confirms the ambiguity of the effect of potential migration on the human 
capital and welfare of sending countries. As shown in the Appendix, the after-migration average 
                                                 
13 More formally, the migration condition may be written hhmh ′−+>− ηλβα ϑµϑ)( . For the sake of simplicity, 
let )'( hhm ληϑµ −≤ hold, so that for any positive ϑh , the migration condition holds. Alternatively, one could 
assume that ϑm  be uniformly distributed over the interval (0, υm ). In this case the probability that a skilled worker 
migrates is calculated as 
υ
ϑϑ
ηλβα
m
hhhhp
′+−−= )()(  and the optimal human capital can be shown to be 
22 )(
))((
)(
~~
βα
ληβα
βα
β
υυ
υϑ −−
−′−+−−= m
hh
m
mh P . Since the SOC imposes 2)( βαυ −>m , it follows PP hh ϑϑ ˆ
~~ > . 
With respect to the following analysis, this alternative framework implies (non crucial) changes in education subsidies 
but not in optimal Ghϑ  so that propositions below remain (qualitatively) unaltered. 
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human capital Ph
~
 is the sum of two addends: the first is lower than Ph  because skilled migration 
tends to reduce average human capital, while the second accounts for the positive impact of 
migration perspectives on human capital (the expected private emigration premium to human 
capital )( βα −p ), thus offsetting to some extent the first effect. So, the difference PP hh~ −  is a 
measure of the net brain gain: it is increasing in α  and decreasing in β  as both enter the 
differential return to human capital and the latter in addition is proportional to the closed economy 
optimal average human capital. Therefore higher investments in human capital are fuelled by 
prospective higher returns but this does not necessarily involve a brain gain, as some skilled 
workers go abroad. Consequently, the change in welfare PP WˆW~ −  is ambiguous as well. Stark 
and Wang (2002) consider the migration rate p  as an instrument to maximise the welfare gain 
from migration. In the present framework instead the probability to migrate is exogenous and thus 
government gets social optimum by using education subsidies. 
Let us consider then the behaviour of the government. As in the case of closed economy,  its 
purpose consists in being re-elected. Since elections are held after migration, some migrants may 
not take part in elections. This because on one side many migrants lose contact with their origin 
country and are little interested in going to the polls and on the other, especially in less developed 
countries, voting from abroad is unfeasible and participation in elections requires to face the cost of 
going back home. For simplicity, let us suppose that no migrant votes: in this case, only the welfare 
of staying behind population will be relevant for re-election and so government will disregard 
emigrants’ welfare. Re-election probability can be therefore written as 
υϑθ ΠΠΠ )z(z)z,W( R −+= 1 , where RWθ  is the welfare of residents. 
A different concern of benevolent governments for residents and migrants is quite widely 
accepted in the literature14. Mirrlees (1982) pointed out that even in a democratic political system, 
including all humans wellbeing in the social welfare function is “surely morally defensible but (…) 
not what an adviser to a democratic state is expected to be guided by”. Here the greater attention of 
social planner for residents’ interests is justified by the different attitude to affect political 
competition through voting between residents and migrants. 
Keeping the same assumptions on θΠ  as in the case of closed economy, we can write the 
planner objective function as  υϑ πππ W)z(zWW RG −+= 1 . This is maximised when 
 υϑυυϑϑ λλββ hzhzhkhzhhzW
G )1(
2
1)1(
2
1 2
0
2 −++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=    (5) 
                                                 
14 See for example Wilson (2006), Egger et al. (2007) and Docquier et al. (2008). 
 11
is maximised, i.e. for λβϑ +=Gh~  and )(~ 0 λβυ += kh G . Hence, the optimal average human 
capital turns out to be )()()1()(
~
0 λβλβλβ +=+−++= Zkzzh G  and social welfare is 
easily calculated to be 
2
)(~ 2λβ += ZW G . The government achieves its objectives by paying 
different subsidies and levying different taxes to unskilled and skilled workers15. The former receive 
subsidies and pay taxes at rates respectively equal to λβ
λ
υ +=
2~s  and λυ =t~  while for the latter 
λβ
βαλ
ϑ +
−−= ))((2~ ps  and )(~ βαλϑ −−= pt . 
These results allow to state 
 
Proposition 3. If the social return is not lower than the expected private emigration premium to 
human capital, i.e. if )(p βαλ −≥ , a government aiming at being re-elected sets non negative 
education subsidies, thus increasing average human capital and per capita income. Conversely, if 
)(p βαλ −< , education subsidies for skilled are negative and the effect on average human 
capital and per capita income is ambiguous. In any case education policies increase residents’ 
welfare. 
Proof in Appendix. 
 
 The meaning of Proposition 3 is clear. In the absence of migration, the government 
subsidizes human capital increasingly with its social return (Proposition 1). Migration stimulates 
human capital accumulation as well by the expected private emigration premium to skilled workers 
(Proposition 2). But human capital Phϑ
~
 is (ex-post) too large for non migrating skilled workers: that 
is why government which cares only for staying behind residents reduces subsidies for skilled and 
may even make them negative. This justifies why policies may even imply a reduction of average 
human capital and per capita income if )(p βαλ −< . In any case however education policies 
raise the value of residents’ welfare function W~ . 
 More generally, from the perspective of a source country, a comparison between the case of 
closed economy and the one of migration  is made by  
                                                 
15 As long as individuals are assumed to consume only after paying taxing, there is no incentive for them to disguise 
their type θ  because government learns which type workers belong to as soon as they complete their education and can 
therefore effectively introduce sanctions at least equal to expected gains from cheating. An interesting extension could 
explicitly deal with the problem of suitable incentives for truthtelling. 
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Proposition 4. Compared to the case of closed economy, in the presence of education policies, a 
positive probability of migrating for skilled workers (i) reduces average education subsidy 
increasingly with p, (ii) does not alter individual human capital and decreases (iii) average human 
capital, (iv) social welfare and (v)  per capita income increasingly with p. 
Proof in Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4 makes several important points. First, as shown by 4(i), migration hampers 
education policies by reducing optimal subsidies. The reason is that migration makes the gap 
between individual optimal human capital and government target smaller. As a result, the optimal 
education subsidy is decreasing with migration rate, consistently with the evidence that poor high-
emigration countries tend to invest in human capital accumulation relatively less than richer 
countries. A similar result is obtained by Justman and Thisse (1997), Docquier et al. (2008) and 
Demange et al. (2008). 
Second, migration does not alter individual human capital as government subsidies are 
tailored to promote the same investment as in the case of closed economy. The reason is that 
residents do not have any advantage from migration of their countrymen. As a consequence, these 
latter end up with forming a suboptimal level of human capital. This has two relevant implications 
which will be addressed in the next section. The first is that internalising migration advantages 
might be a way to increase government human capital target and then to reduce underinvestment of 
migrants. The second is the negative externality that suboptimal migrants’ human capital involves 
for destination countries. As we will see, these two facts in turn imply that a Bhagwati tax designed 
as a voluntary transfer of a share of migrants’ income taxes to origin from destination countries may 
be ex-ante beneficial even for these latter. By embodying part of the gains of migration in the 
welfare of origin countries’ residents, the transfer may serve to promote a higher investment in 
human capital of migrants and bring about a positive externality outweighing the fiscal loss. 
Third, migration unambiguously leads to a detrimental brain drain and a welfare loss since 
education policies completely crowd out the positive incentive effects connected to potential 
migration. A similar result is obtained by Docquier et al. (2008); however, while in their model the 
welfare loss of emigration is simply due to the lower population size, here the effects of migration 
and education policies on residents’ average human capital and welfare are directly accounted for. 
Finally, migration is found to imply lower average human capital, welfare and income. 
While poverty has been widely recognised as one of the main determinants of large migration 
phenomena, Proposition 4 points out an opposite causal relationship: the higher migration rate, the 
lower education subsidies, the lower human capital and per capita income. If both these causal 
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relations are at work, poor countries run a strong risk to be trapped in a chain of low income, high 
migration, low human capital investments, lower income and so on. 
 
4. Education policies and the Bhagwati tax. 
In this section a Bhagwati tax is considered in order to understand whether it can positively affect 
the welfare of source countries, as originally maintained by Bhagwati, and in addition to identify 
possible conditions under which a Bhagwati tax might be universally welfare improving, i.e. 
beneficial to residents and migrants of origin countries as well as to destination countries. This latter 
point is especially relevant to the end of practical application of the tax, because if everybody was 
better off with the tax, difficulties of implementation could be more easily overcome. 
Assume that a Bhagwati tax )hh( ′+ηατ ϑ , where 1<τ  is the tax rate and )hh( ′+ηα ϑ  
is migrants’ income, be levied on pqn  migrants, and paid (possibly in addition to ordinary income 
taxes) to destination countries. These latter collect the fiscal revenues and then transfer it to 
n)pq( −1  natives staying at home country, receiving each a transfer16 of  )hh(T ′+= ηαφτ ϑ , 
where 
pq
pq
−≡ 1φ  is the ratio between migrants and staying behind residents’ in the origin 
country. Since T  and τ  enter individual and social welfare ((4), (4’) and (5)), the Bhagwati tax 
turns out to affect decisions on human capital accumulation. 
In particular, the expected welfare of talented and untalented individuals can be now 
respectively written as 
    ( ) 20 2111 ϑϑϑϑϑϑϑ λβτηα hsht)Thh)(p(m))(hh(p)W(E −−−++−+−−′+=      (6) 
where, in order to keep a productivity advantage for the foreign economy, βτα >− )1(  is 
assumed, and 
2
02
1
υ
υ
υυυ λβ hk
sThh)t(W −−++−=       (6’) 
As shown by (6) and (6’), the Bhagwati tax allows staying behind population to take a share of 
migration gains off the pocket of migrants through transfers T . This means that a greater human 
capital favours not only migrants who enyoy a higher return abroad but even residents by 
magnifying their revenues from nationals abroad. 
                                                 
16 The simplifying hypothesis of lump-sum transfers is not crucial. What really matters is that fiscal revenues sent back 
to origin countries enter welfare of staying behind residents. For example, the funds raised by the Bhagwati tax could be 
used by destination countries to finance schools and universities in the source country. 
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Maximising (6) and (6’) yields private optimal human capital17 
ϑ
ϑ
ϑ
βταβ
s
))((pth P −
−−+−=
1
1(
, (or simply ))1(( βταβϑ −−+= ph P(  in case no education 
policies are implemented) and 
ϑ
υ
υ
β
s
tkh P −
−=
10
(
 ( βυ 0kh P =(  without education policies).  
Unlike private agents, the social planner does not consider transferred inflows as 
externalities. Thus substituting for T  in the social welfare function, a government aiming at being 
re-elected maximises 
)hh(h
k
h)()z(hh)(zW G ′++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+= ηαφτλβλβ ϑυυϑϑ 2
0
2
2
11
2
1
   (7) 
where the last addend accounts for the positive impact that migration exerts on residents’ average 
welfare through the transfer sent back to the source country. Socially optimal human capital from 
(7) are respectively φατλβϑ ++=Gh(  for skilled and )(0 λβυ += khG(  for unskilled. The 
average human capital turns out to be φατλβ z)(Zh G ++=( . The values of subsidy and tax 
rates suitable to get the policy target Ghϑ
(
 and Ghυ
(
 are now 
( )
pp
ppps ατλβ
ατβταλ
ϑ ++−
+−−−−=
))(1(
))1(()1(2(  and 
p
ppt −+−−−= 1))1((
ατβταλϑ(  for 
talented, and again λβ
λ
υ +=
2s(  and λυ =t(  for untalented. As a consequence we can state 
 
Proposition 5. Without education policies, a Bhagwati tax (i) reduces the average human capital 
and (ii) has ambiguous effects on residents’ welfare. With education policies (implemented by a 
government aiming at being re-elected), a Bhagwati tax increases (iii) education subsidies, (iv) 
average human capital and (v) residents’ welfare. 
Proof in Appendix.  
 
Proposition 5(i)-5(ii)  points out the possible negative effects of the Bhagwati tax on human 
capital and welfare of source countries. Human capital decreases because the expected private 
emigration premium is lowered by the tax. The impact on residents’ welfare is ambiguous: on one 
side, human capital is pushed down while on the other residents receive transfers from abroad 
thanks to the Bhagwati tax. When optimal education policies are implemented, the effects of a 
                                                 
17 T is assumed to be considered a positive externality by individuals because they do not take into account the effect of 
their investment in human capital on transfers. 
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Bhagwati tax significantly change (Proposition 5(iii) to 5(v)). In this case, the weight of expected 
private emigration premium (included the additional diminishing effect of the Bhagwati tax) on 
human capital accumulation is neutralised by education subsidies and taxes. On the other hand, the 
Bhagwati tax transfers a part of migrants’ higher gains abroad to residents. Since transfers to 
residents are proportional to human capital of migrants, the optimal level of education subsidies and 
human capital increases. Finally, residents’ welfare increases as well, as for staying behind workers 
the advantage of receiving the transfer prevails over the excess effort connected to additional human 
capital. 
The last question concerns the hypothesis that in the presence of education policies a 
Bhagwati tax might be universally welfare improving, i.e. it may benefit to some extent all 
individuals, origin country’s residents and migrants, and destination country’s workers. It is 
worthwhile to notice that without education policies this can never occur because in this case 
migrants are forced to suboptimally investing in human capital and in addition loose a share of their 
income. When education policies are implemented, the Bhagwati tax raises origin countries 
residents’ welfare (Proposition 5). As migrants’ human capital is larger than it would be without the 
tax, destination countries are benefitted as well (assuming that the cost of transferring fiscal 
revenues is low enough). Therefore for the Bhagwati tax to be universally welfare improving, we 
only need to identify the conditions under which for migrants the benefit deriving from a higher 
human capital is not less than the cost connected to the payment of the tax. 
 
Proposition 6. In the presence of optimal education policies, if the private return to human capital 
in the host country and the share of migrants on population in the source country are sufficiently 
large, a Bhagwati tax levied at rate 0>∗τ  increases migrants’ welfare and is therefore 
universally welfare improving. 
Proof in Appendix. 
 
According to Proposition 6, a Bhagwati tax may be beneficial even for migrants (and 
therefore for all), provided that the return to human capital and the number of migrants relative to 
population be high enough. Again, the interpretation of this result is straight. Both a relatively large 
number of migrants φ  and a large return to human capital α  imply that the impact of education 
policies on human capital is bigger. In addition a big α  also implies that the advantage for migrants 
of having a larger human capital stock is greater. In these circumstances, migrants are ex-ante better 
off when a Bhagwati tax is levied. Obviously, this can not prevent them from behaving 
opportunistically, i.e. enjoying a larger human capital and income thanks to the Bhagwati tax, but 
still evading the tax. However, if a Bhagwati tax was not longer seen as discriminatory and ethically 
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deplorable, migrants could less easily renege on a pledge made when receiving education subsidies 
to pay the tax once migrated. 
Another possible way to implement a Bhagwati tax does not involve any additional fiscal 
burden for migrants. In this case, destination countries would voluntarily forgo a part of fiscal 
revenues coming from ordinary taxation on migrants’ income, to transfer it to origin countries. If 
the transferred share of fiscal revenues is equal to Bhagwati taxation )hh(npq ′+ηατ ϑ , all 
nationals of origin countries would be better off (with respect to the previous case, residents’ 
welfare would be unaltered, while migrants would have the same human capital without paying the 
tax). The reason for which destination countries’ governments could accept to make a Bhagwati 
transfer is that the benefit resulting from the increase in the human capital of immigrants might 
offset the cost of lower fiscal revenues. Proposition 7 points out the conditions under which this 
may occur. 
 
Proposition 7. In the presence of optimal education policies, if private and social returns to human 
capital in the host country and the share of migrants on population in the source country are 
sufficiently large, a transfer equal to the overall amount of a Bhagwati tax levied at rate 0>∗τ  
increases destination countries’ welfare and is therefore universally welfare improving. 
Proof in Appendix. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is again based on the impact that a large share of 
migrants and a large return to human capital have on the effectiveness of education policies on the 
investment in human capital by migrants. The importance of social return can be easily explained: 
the greater η , the larger the effect of a bigger human capital of migrants on destination countries 
residents’ welfare. 
 
5. Concluding remarks. 
The Bhagwati brain drain tax proposal dating back to more than thirty years ago has been criticized 
from different viewpoints. In particular, recent literature has pointed out that this tax would hamper 
accumulation of human capital by reducing gains from skilled migration. In this paper, it is argued 
that when taking into account social externalities of human capital, and optimal policies 
implemented by a government caring only for left behind residents, a brain drain tax tends rather to 
foster the investment in human capital and increase residents’ income and welfare.  
The Bhagwati tax could even be universally welfare improving. In case the tax is paid by 
migrants in addition to the ordinary income taxation, if the private return to human capital in the 
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host country and the share of migrants on population in the source country are sufficiently large, it 
is proved that the larger fiscal burden borne by migrants can be outweighed by higher human capital 
and gross income. Difficulties would remain in practically implementing a Bhagwati tax, especially 
because prosecution for the evasion of this tax is more difficult than for other tax offences. 
However, if the Bhagwati tax can be shown to be beneficial even for migrants, moral justifications 
of evasion based on the principle that this tax is discriminating would be seriously challenged and 
this might have effects on the propensity to evade. 
Alternatively, should the transfer be financed by the destination country, if private and social 
returns to human capital in the host country and the share of migrants on population in the source 
country are sufficiently large, the fiscal losses suffered by the governments of hosting countries 
might be outweighed by the advantage of having more skilled immigrants. In this case,  
international cooperation and aids to poor high-migration countries by rich target countries would 
have a rational self-interest basis. Restrictive migration policies are costly; financing education in 
poor countries to employ more skilled immigrants might be more profitable for all.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
The pre-migration average human capital )(pqQ βαβ −+  is clearly greater than Ph . The 
difference ββα )()(~ ZQpzhh PP −−−=−  has ambiguous sign. Migration affects residents’ 
social welfare as well by the quantity 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−=−
2
)(
2
)()(ˆ~ βλββαλβα ZQppzWW PP  
which again may take either sign. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
The inequality )(p βαλ −≥  is a sufficient condition for the following three inequalities to hold: 
02 ≥+
−−= λβ
βαλ
ϑ
))(p(s~ ; 
01 0 >−+−−=− λβαλ k)z())(p(zh~h~ PG ;
[ ] 01 0 >−+−−+=− λβαλλβ k)z())(p(z)(y~y~ PG . 
Notice that the individual human capital is increasing for unskilled PG hh υυ
~~ >  and non decreasing 
for skilled PG h~h~ ϑϑ ≥ . 
If  )(p βαλ −< , it will clearly follow 0<ϑs~ , while the differences PG h~h~ −  and 
PG y~y~ −  will have ambiguous sign. 
Finally,  
2
1
2
2
0
2 λβαλ k)z())(p(zW~W~ PG −+−−=−  is always positive. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
4.(i) is proved by 0ˆ~ =− υυ ss  and  λβ
βα
ϑϑ +
−−=− )(2ˆ~ pss . 4.(ii) follows from GG hh θθ ˆ~ = . 
Noting that 0))1/(( >∂
−∂
p
pqp
, 4.(iii) is demonstrated by calculating 
)(
1
)1()1())((
~
0 λβλβ +−
−−−=+−=−
pq
qpqkQZhh GG , 4(iv) from 
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2
)(
1
)1()1(
2
)()(ˆ~
2
0
2 λβλβ +
−
−−−=+−=−
pq
qpqkQZWW GG  and 4.(iv) from  
2
0
2 )(
1
)1()1())((ˆ~ λβλβ +−
−−−=+−=−
pq
qpqkQZyy GG . 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
5.(i) follows from  PP hh ϑϑ
~<(  and PP hh υυ ~=
(
. 5.(ii) is proved by calculating 
( ))())1(()())1((
1
~ 22 ατλβταβαα
ηβταβτα −−−−−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ′+−−+−=− ppzphppq
pqWW PP
(
5.(iii) derives from 
))())(1((
))(1()((2~ λβταλβ
λββαβταϑϑ +++−
+−+−+=−
pp
pppss(  and υυ ss ~=(  . 5.(iv) 
follows from GG hh ϑϑ
~>(  and GG hh υυ ~=
(
. Finally, by substituting optimal human capital in (7) and 
(5), it is easily found that the change in residents’ welfare is positive, i.e.  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+′+++=− φατα
ηλβφατ )z(h))(z(W~W GG
2
11
(
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
The change in migrants’ welfare due to the introduction of the Bhagwati tax is 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−′++−= )(hWM ταφ
ηλβατ∆ 1 . At 0=τ , 0=MW∆  and 
h)(WM ′−+−=∂
∂ ηλβαφατ
∆ 2 . It follows that if α  and φ  are sufficiently large, there is an 
interval of values for 0>∗τ  such that 0>∆ MW . 
 
Proof of Proposition 7. 
Assume that in destination country individual welfare is hhhW DDD ′+−= ηα 2
2
, where Dh  is 
residents’ individual human capital, ϑψψ hhh D )1( −+=′  is the average human capital (which 
accounts for immigrants’ human capital) and ψ  is the share of native over total population. A 
transfer equal to a Bhagwati tax at rate τ  brings about a change in welfare DW∆  equal to the 
difference between φατψη )( −1  (the gain deriving from rising immigrants’ human capital ϑh ) 
and the additional individual cost of the transfer. This latter, in case population is equal to n  (as in 
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the source country), amounts to [ ]Dh)))(((pq ηψφατλβψηατ +++−+ 1 . At 0=τ , 
0=∆ DW  and [ ]))((hpq
)(W
D
D λβψψη
λβψατ
∆ +−+−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−−
−=∂
∂ 1
1
1
. It follows that if 
α , η  and pq  are sufficiently large, there is an interval of values for 0>∗τ  such that 0>∆ DW . 
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